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1 UWITED STATES 
ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMEMT AGEHCY 
TEST BAN TREATY 
Questions and Answers 
Why is this k s t  bum treaty # o m  md- 
to& ktmest? 
There are a number of reasons. This 
treaty can: 
' act as a deterrent to the spread of nu- 
clear weapons to many additional countries, 
thereby lessening the danger of nuclear war; 
' drastically reduce or end rhe hamrds of 
radioactive fallout; 
' have the practiea1 effect of slowing 
down the pace of the arms race; 
' be a first step toward reduced world 
tensions and broader areas of agreement on 
the eontrol of nuclear weapons. 
What are some of the reasons why the 
Soviet UPeiou might Beiiwe this agree- 
meut to &# h i t s  hterest? 
Some of the advantages of such an agree- 
ment serw the interests of the U.S.S.R. just 
as they serve our interests. Continuation of 
radioactive fallout is, in the long run, a haz- 
ard to the Soviet people as it is to Ameti- 
am. The danger that 0th- countries, same 
of which may act in atn irresponsible fash- 
ion, might a c q u i ~  nuclear weapons pwes 
a h e a t  to the security of both rhe U.S.S.R. 
and the United States. 
Then there's the matter of economia. An 
unrestricted testing program is wry d y .  
There is reason to believe the Soviet 
Union is aware of these points. There is 
also reason to believe that it sees the a- 
meat as serving its in- in tbe ideo- 
IogiaI dispute which now pIagues the 
C~rnmunisr camp. 
W m  the ZiPPeited test Ban agreemeut 
reached witboat any strings &ached- 
na secret deds or commifnaents on 
other matt&$? 
That is correct. Agreement on the test 
h a  h u e  was not linked to agreement on 
any other matter. 
At the Morrrw negotiations and since 
t h t  time the United States bas expressed 
its wiilingness to consider other means of 
reducing tensions and controlling and lim- 
iting arms. This reaffirms a position we 
have consistently taken. 
Wbut kinds of tests are b a w d  b y  the 
agreemmt? 
The treaty bans tests in the atmaphere, 
in space, and under water, including terri- 
torial waters or high seas. Underground 
testa are, of course, permitted so long as 
they do not spread radioactive debris beyond 
rhe territory of the state where they are 
m u d d .  
Why are udergroz~nd tests mod in- 
clnded ha the agreememt? 
Undergmufid tests are the most dif6,cult 
to police, because it is not always possible 
to distiaguisb seismic waves produced by 
earthquakes from those mused by nuclear 
explosions. Where there is doubt, it is nec- 
essary ta conduct on-site inspections at the 
location where the event occurred to deter- 
mine the cause of the tremor. The Soviet 
Union bas so far ha, wilIing to accept only 
a token number of these inspections, d 
Soviet representatives have refused even to 
d i m s  ways ia which inspections could be 
most effectively conducted. 
Are there m y  restrbctdms om u~der -  
groand teskkg? 
Any number of underground nudeur ex- 
plosions, of any size or type, for peaceful 
or military purpom, may be carried out m 
long as such explosions do not cause radio- 
active debris to be present outside the terri- . 
torial limits of the country conducting the 
explmion. 
Fotlowing aa underground explosion it is 
not unusual for some radioactive material 
to reach the earth's surface through cracks 
or fissures in the ground. Such nuclear de- 
bris generally remains localized near the 
point of detonation. Under the treaty there 
wauld be no violation so long as this debris 
remained wirhin national borders, 
The agreement refers to  a baa on a ~ y  
type of auclear explosion mder  zuuter, 
including itmritorki wuters or high 
seus. WBd does this mem? 
It means that underwater nudear explo- 
sions cannot be carried out anywhere in the 
oceans, inchding the waters immediately 
adjacent to a country's shores. They are 
also prohibited in rivers or inland lakes, 
Is it tpwe tbat the treaty in no wuy re- 
st r ic ts  oar scse of ntrclerw werlfions in 
time of wsr? 
Yes. The treaty deaIs with the bestiug of 
nuclear wempws, not with their use in time 
of war. 
Does the $re&y #eve& a party from 
givhg hfwm&io.tt a d  bechnkdi as- 
sistawe om t r u c l e ~  mddders to otbm 
cozcntries? 
The treaty prevents signatory states from 
"causing, encouraging, or in any way par- 
ticipating in" a nuclear explosion in the 
three prohibited environments. This would 
not prevent a parry from providing technical 
assistance md information so long as it did 
not contribute materially to a test or test 
series in the prohibited env imnmenrs. 
Does the Soviet U&o# krlve a veto 
power over ametfdmemts to  the beady? 
The three original parties to rhe treaty- 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the U.S.S.R-have the power to veto treaty 
amendments. Any amendment to be 
adopted must be approved by a majority of 
all the signatory nations, including all three 
of the original parties. Any amendment 
that would affect the rights or obligations 
of the United Stafes under the treaty would, 
of course, be submitted to the Senate for 
its advice and consent. 
If the United States, as a Defiosibury 
Gover~a~nmt-tht is,  one which cam 
receive instrumelpis of rrftifiatdon from 
other states--were to accept an iwstrtt- 
meat of ratification from B regime we 
do mot mow recog&xe, watcld this sot 
constdrdts recopition? 
No. Actually the three original parties to 
the treat--the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and the U .S .S .R .de  the De- 
positmy Governmenu. If a regime which 
one or wen two of the three do not recognize 
wishes to adhere to the treaty, its instrument 
of ratification need be submitted only to that 
Depositary Government which does recog- 
nize it. 
Woddu't tbs U d e d  Skstes be corn- 
pelhd to r e c b p k e  dl regimes whkb 
adhere to the tredy? 
No. The fundamentml factor in deter- 
mining recognition is intent. It is clear in 
international law that particiption in a 
multilateral treaty with a nonrecognized 
regime does nor entail recognition of that 
regime. 
Does #be fteroby payAde t k  rt @ur#y 
muy witbdrw if b beldwes i t s  security 
iMerests #are behg  thsatmed? 
Ymi. The treaty contains a withdrawal 
clause which provides that a party may with- 
draw "if it decides that extmurdinary events, 
related m the subject matter of this Treaty, 
have jeopardized the supreme intetegts of 
its countrytry" Whether its interests are 
k ing  jeopardized by a test or a series of 
tests is for that sram alone to decide. If it 
beliwes this to h the case, it must give 3 
months' notice of its intention to withdraw. 
The withdrawal provision, with its re- 
quirement for 3 months' notice, d m  not 
restrict the right of a state in international 
law m withdraw immediately from the treaty 
if there is a pfain violation by another party. 
Wbat are #be risks of sscre# testkg d 
s W m  wkhd~~wd? 
Actually, the danger of clanddne resting 
in the prohibited environments-the atmw 
phere, space, and under water--is minimal. 
In addition m the fact rhat we have gen- 
erally & verification capabilities in these 
environmen~, and ma improve them, there 
would be Iittle value in anothei nation's 
attempring to carry out in these environ- 
ments the types of tesa that it could freely 
conduct underground 
W e  will maintain on a standby basis those 
testing facilities affected by the ban. This is 
a strong deterrent to any nation which might 
conremplate suddenly breaking off the treaty 
and testing in the'atmosphere, in space, or 
under water. 
How wo& w e  k m w  if a stde were 
to violate #be & g r e e d ?  
The system for policing the agreement is 
really a tecip-1 inspection system-you 
@ice me, I police you. The United States 
has a detection system for the purpose of 
moniroriog nuclmr tmriag by ocher coun- 
tries. Our present capabilities to detect tests 
in the atmosphere and under water are good. 
Existing apbilities for space are limited, 
but most of the basic instruments r e q u i d  
for improvement in this environment have 
a M y  been developed. 
Under the treaty we wi11 continue to op 
era# our presenr system, and we will also 
be free to muke whatever improvements are 
necesq in order to assure outselves &at 
any signiftnt testing by another country 
would be d d .  
Is it possible to detect tests if tbey are 
codwddd k fur oaer space? 
The primary concern in space tests an- 
ters on tests of severaI megatons or more, 
since the smaller t a t s  can be conducted 
underground. 
There is at present a possibility that deep 
in outer space iIlepI tests might go unde- 
teaed. But we a l d y  haw the capability 
to coustruct a detection system that would 
& multimegaton rests ia space almast 
impossible to conceaI. Any time we deter- 
mine that there is a need for such a system, 
it can be put into operation. 
A party contemplaring clandestine tests 
in space has more to reckon with than the 
possibilities of king caught. Not only is 
this resting an extremely expnsive under- 
taking but it is time-consuming. To obtain 
results from a test millions of miles away 
could take weeks or months. This problem 
is further compounded by a n u m k  of other 
technical difficulties that would have to be 
overcome to gain even limited knowledge 
from the explosion. 
The Sowkt U ~ i o m  b r ~ ~  tested k g e p  
mdtimegatoa wespoas ~sbapz we have. 
From Q rniidary stadpoint, rzrm't we 
going ;No this treaty ab a disdudage? 
W e  already haw in our stockpile a large 
number of nuclear weapons with dzereot 
amounts of explosive power. These a n  be 
wed for a variety of strategic or tactical 
purposes. W e  also have s number of d i k -  
enr sophisticated systems for delivery of our 
nuclear weapons. Our present nuclear ar- 
senal, combined with our conventional 
£0- permics us to respond in a W b l e  
manner and in a number of di8erenr ways 
to any oven act of aggression. 
It is true that the Soviefs have tested nu- - wapoag of a yield higher than we 
have. But we have not explded or d m l -  
oped weapons in this range of very high 
yield because we do nor believe them 
newsmy for our security. By choice we 
have concentrated on efficient weapons that 
have a lesser but sdicient yield. W e  be- 
lieve that lesser yields combined wirh large 
numbers of bard or mobile delivery systems 
provide the United States wirh greater 
w r i t y .  
In these c h m s m m s  it is dear that we 
are nor at a disadvantage in terms of nuclear 
weapons development. 
Wbrxt about d e v e o m  of as amti- 
6rldIistic missile? Do#'# ~ U B  w e d  fw- 
#bm tests in the dtaosphere to  deter- 
lrPiw tbe feasibiIay of s ~ c b  a system? 
Further nudear tests will not solw cer- 
caia basic problems which we in de- 
velopment of the anti-ballistic m i s s i l e  
(ABM). First, any ABM defense is suscepti- 
ble to saturation-eemy missiles launched 
in such quantities ua to overwhelm the de- 
fensive missiles. Secondly, decays or mis- 
siles with dummy warheads, launched along 
with the real missiles, could lead the de- 
fensive missiles astray. 
Since there is stiU a question as to tbe 
effectiveness of the ABM, no decision to date 
has been made as to whether we should 
deploy such a system. 
W e  m e  e v d e d y  a b e d  of the Sovie# 
U ~ w n  iPP the deuelo#mspat of tactical 
paucZear weupom. U d e r  the treaty, 
ptwtks B T ~  free to #est ~ t m g ~ o ~ ~ w d  
where math CWPZ 84 dam to  devekop 
these weupom. Does#'# this give the 
Soviet Uawn un opporbumity to c b  
up in tbis area? 
Since underground wting is permissible 
under the treaty, we m match the U.S.S.R. 
twt-for-- in this area if need be. The 
United States has thus far had more experi- 
ence in undergmund testing than the So- 
vim. h the a h m e  of any test ban the 
xace at which the Soviet Union could de- 
velop its aacciaal weapons would certainly 
be grearer since it could then test in aU 
environmen~ without limitation. 
Supfiose Prawe OP Compreu~isb C b k  
tests h the prob*&ed aawonmm#s. 
How tuorrld dkis a#ect tbe agreement? 
What action, if any, a party to the trmty 
might take in this event would depend on 
the cirmmsmnm at the time. In any mse, 
should a signatory state consider its national 
security seriously jeopardized by wing by 
others, it would lx free to withdraw fern 
the agreement. 
With this treaty in &st, t h e  wouId cer- 
tainly be greater pmsum on Prance and 
Gommunist China to dsist  from any testing 
program than would exist in the a h s e e  of 
an agreement. And regardless of wbut 
Communist China and France may do, there 
is the fact that n number of other d n i c a l l y  
sbk countries have already signed the treaty. 
This alone represents a signific~utt gain t ~ -  
ward halting the s p r d  of nuclear weapons 
to many countries. 
Z s ~ l ' t  $here a reai danger that with #his 
agreement C b u d  we may now feei we 
cam relax oar g k r d  against fut"tker 
&ternfits by the Commacpu'sts to m- 
moucb wr free-wmid nathm? 
This may be the danger we face. 
It would be a great mistake to wume 
that, bemuse the Soviet Union is a party to 
this limited test ban agreement, the millen- 
nium has arrived. 
The Communists have in no way re- 
nounced their avowed objective of -hi 
domination even though the Soviet Union 
may use means other than nudear war w 
achieve it. While we must continue ear- 
nestly to seek further arrangements designed 
to reduce international tensionti and limit - 
and control ttrmaments, we m m  not so relax 
our guard as to invite aggression. 
How does the &eaty &ec# the Atomic 
Emwgy Conzmissio~~'~ Plozvsbare @YO- 
gram for peaxefd uses of ratomzk 
el~ergy? 
miah of the Atomic Energy Commis- 
sion say that the treaty will not prevent 
development of device for upe in Plowshm 
nor will it seriously inhibit scientific proj- 
ects, or mining or remurce development 
projecrs, which can be wried out deep un- 
derground. On tbe other hand, the treaty's 
&=t on the excavation program will de- 
pend on rhe location of the spec& excava- 
tion. An explosion could not be carried 
out if it would cause radiwtive debris to 
be p m t  outside the territorial limits of 
the cumtry involved. 
Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests 
in the Atmosphere, 
in Outer Space and Under Water 
The Governments of the United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern Ireland, and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereia- 
after referred to as the "Original Parties", 
Proclaiming as their principal dm the 
speediest possible achievement of an agree- 
ment on general and complete disarmament 
under strict international mnmI in accord- 
ance with the objectives of the United Na- 
tions which would put an end to the 
armaments race and eliminate the incentive 
to the production and testing of dl kinds 
of fReaponq including nucleou weapons, 
Seeking ro achieve the discontinuance of 
all test explrwions of nuclear weapons for all 
time, determined to continue negotiations to 
tbis end, and desiring to put an end to the 
contamination of man's environment by 
radimive mheea ,  
Haw agreed ao foIlows: 
Article I 
I. Each of the Parries to this Treaty un- 
der& to prohibit, to prevent, and not to 
carry out any nuclear weapon &st expIosion, 
or any other nuclear explosion, at any place 
under its jurisdiction or control: 
(a) in the atmosphere; beyond its limits, 
iucluding outer space; or derwater, in- 
cluding territorial waters or high seas; or 
(b) in any other environment if such ex- 
plosion causes radioacrive debris m k 
present outside the territorial limits of the 
State under whose jurisdiction .or control 
such explosion is conducted. It is under- 
stood in this connection that the provisions 
of this subparagraph are without prejudice 
to the conclusion of a treaty resulting in the 
permanent banning of d l  nuclear test explo- 
sions, including all such explosions under- 
ground, the conclusion of which, as the 
Parties have stated in the Preamble to this 
Treaty, they seek to achieve. 
2. Each of the Parties oo this Tmty 
undertakes furthermore to refrain from 
causing, encouraging, or in m y  way partici- 
pating in, the carrying out of any nudew 
weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear 
explosion, mywhere which wouId take 
place ia any of the environments described, 
or have the dm referred to, in paragraph 1 
of this Article. 
1. Any Patty may propose amendments to 
this Treaty. The text of any pro@ 
amendment shall h- submitted to the De- 
psimry Governments which shall drmlate 
it to all Parties to this Treaty. Thereafter, 
if ~ t e d  to o so by one-third or mare of 
the Parties, the Depitary Governments 
shall convene a conference, to which they 
sbdl invite all the Parties, to wnsider such  
amendment. 
2. Any amendment to this Treaty rust k 
approved by a majority of the votes of dI 
the Parties to this Treaty, including the w ~ e s  
of a11 of the Original Parties. The amend- 
ment shalI enter into force for all Parties 
upon the deposit of instruments of r a t i b -  
tion by a majority of all &e P d e s ,  includ- 
ing the instruments of ratification of all of 
the Original Parties. 
A&k I11 
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States 
for signature. Any State which d a  not 
sign this Treaty before its entry into force in 
accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article 
may accede to it at any time. 
2. This Treaty shaIJ be subje~r to ratifica- 
tion by signatory Stares. Instrumen# of 
rolti6catiw and instruments of accession s h d  
be depited 4 t h  the Governments of the 
Original P m w t h e  United States of 
America, the United Kingdom of Great 
Brirain and Northern Ireland, and the Union 
of Soviet M t  Republi-which are 
hereby designated the D q d t t u y  Govern- 
menu. 
3. This T-y shall enter into foree after 
its r a t i f h h  by all the O r i g i d  par ti^ and 
the d e p i t  of their imtruments of ratifica- 
tion. 
4. For Seam wh- in~frumen~ of rati- 
fication or eaession are depiped s u b  
quent to the wtry into force of this Treaty, 
it W enter into fom on the date of rhe 
depdt d their instruments of rati6cation 
or- 
5. The fipositary Governments shal1 
px~mptly inform all signatory and d i n g  
States of the date of each signature, the date 
of deposit of emh instrument of ratification 
of and accession to this Treaty, the date of 
its entry inm force, and the date of recleipt 
of any requests for conferen- or other 
notices. 
6. This Treaty shall k registered by the 
Depitary Governments p-t to Article 
102 of the Charter of the United Nations. 
This Treaty shall be of udimioed duration. 
Each Party s h a  in exercising its national 
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from 
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary 
events, related to the subject matter of tbis 
Treaty, have jeopardized the supreme in- 
terests of its country. It shaII give notice of 
such withdrawal to all other Parties to the 
Treaty three months in advance. 
Artick V 
This Treaty, of which the English d 
Russian tern are equally authentic, shall be 
deposited in the archives of the D e p i w  
Governments. Duly cerdfied copies of this 
Treaty &all be transmid by the Depos- 
i m y  Goer-ts to the Governments of 
the signatory and d i n g  Sates. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, 
duly authorimd, have signed this Treaty. 
Dom in triplicate at the city of Moscow, 
the fifth day of August, one thousand nine 
hundred and sw-h. 
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